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Barzakh in Islamic Eschatology: A Critical Study on Fazlur Rahman’s Conception 
Sibawaihi1 
 
In Islamic eschatology, the belief about human existence after death does not cause 
fundamental disputes because the Qur’an has explained that after human life on earth ends 
humans will occupy life in the hereafter.2 Differences arising are in terms of the stages of the 
journey to the hereafter. Generally, Muslims believe that after death, humans will enter a phase 
called barzakh, an intermediary realm between the world and the hereafter.3 But it turns out 
among scholars there are differences in understanding the barzakh. On the one hand, barzakh 
is understood as a realm where initial afterlife court process takes place. Thus, the realm of 
barzakh is the first place that humans encounter to get retaliation for their good or bad deeds. 
If someone is a good person, he will get pleasure; conversely, a bad one will get torture. This 
understanding of happiness and misery in the realm of barzakh is supported by the majority of 
scholars (‘ulamā’) and theologians (mutakallimūn) such as al-Ghazālī, Ibn al-Qayyim al-
Jauziyyah, and al-Suyūṭī.4  
However, on the other hand, there is also opinion that rejects such understanding. 
Proponents of this opinion do not believe that barzakh is understood as a separate 
eschatological stage in which humans get retaliated for their deeds in the form of pleasure or 
suffering until the coming of doomsday (qiyāmah). This opinion is generally supported by 
groups known as rationalists in the Islamic world such as Mu’tazilah, Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, and 
 
1 Lecturer in Philosophy of Science at Faculty of Islamic Education and Teaching Sciences, Sunan 
Kalijaga State Islamic University, Indonesia. 
2 Jane Idleman Smith and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death and 
Resurrection (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), 31. 
3 Ibid., 31-32. 
4 Ibid., 32-34. 
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some Shiites,5 as well as figures who are also known for their rational thought such as Fakhr 
al-Dīn al-Rāzī6 and Fazlur Rahman.7 
It is this pros and cons that aroused the researcher’s academic curiosity to study further 
the barzakh especially the arguments of the rejection of the doctrine of happiness and misery 
in the realm of barzakh. In this case, the conception of Fazlur Rahman was chosen as a 
representation of the concept of modernists who reject the doctrine. In addition, this figure was 
also considered to have a high concern for the development of science in the Islamic world 
which was shown through his studies that were critical of the Muslim scientific heritage of 
medieval age, a century when the scientific structure of Islamic eschatology was widely 
discussed.8 More specifically this study answers three questions: What is the concept of 
barzakh which is believed by the majority of Muslims? Why does Rahman reject the doctrine 
of happiness and misery in the realm of barzakh? How do Islamic texts talk about the doctrines 
of happiness and misery in the realm of barzakh? 
 
Theoretical Framework and Research Methods 
This study is the result of research in eschatology. In Islam, there are two major themes 
in eschatology: the end of the world and the hereafter.9 In the context of the end of the world, 
the discussion of Islamic eschatology is focused on the concept of doomsday (qiyāmah) and 
some eschatological figures: Gog (Ya’jūj) and Magog (Ma’jūj), al-Imām al-Mahḍī, Dajjāl, and 
 
5 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam Agama Peradaban (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2000), 196.  
6 See Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1995), XXIII: 122. 
7 See Fazlur Rahman, Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition: Change and Identity (New York: 
The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1987), 127. 
8 Fazlur Rahman, “Islamic Philosophy,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), IV: 222; Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago & London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 120. 
9 See William J. Hamblin and Daniel C. Peterson, “Eschatology,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the 
Modern Islamic World, ed. John L. Esposito et al. (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), I: 440. 
Compare to H. P. Owen, “Eschatology,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co. Inc. & The Free Press), III: 48; Cyril Glasse, The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (London: Stacey 
International, 1989), 107.  
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‘Īsā who come before the doomsday. While in the context of the hereafter (ākhirah), the 
discussion is focused on the barzakh, the Resurrection Day including the afterlife court, and 
the heaven and hell.10 The concept of Islamic eschatology therefore can be classified into: the 
death, the barzakh, the doomsday, the Resurrection Day, and the heaven and hell. Based on 
this classification, if seen in the order, the barzakh is in between death and doomsday which 
means that barzakh starts after humans die and ends before the doomsday.  
By not conducting field investigations and their procedures such as interviews and 
observations, this study applies library research. In the library research, data sources can be 
found in abundance everywhere and “the researcher needs only ingenuity, and as always a bit 
of luck, to discover them.”11 In analyzing documents, content analysis is applied in this study 
because in the content analysis texts are “seen, read, interpreted, and acted on for their 
meanings, and must therefore be analyzed with such uses in mind. Analyzing texts in the 
contexts of their uses distinguishes content analysis from other methods of inquiry.”12 
In analyzing Rahman's view, the researcher applies a critical analysis which is also 
called critical thinking that implies a critique that identifies the intellectual capacity to make 
judgements.13 Critical analysis is used to elaborate and analyze Rahman's conception of 
barzakh which is contrary to the conception that is generally understood and believed among 
scholars (‘ulamā’). In a broader scope, the application of this critical analysis has enabled the 
researcher to examine and criticize more deeply the various opinions and arguments put 
forward by Rahman in strengthening his perspective on barzakh. On the other hand, Rahman’s 
thoughts are dialogued or communicated with the thoughts of ‘ulamā’ who uphold the doctrine 
 
10 Hamblin and Peterson, “Eschatology,” 440-442; Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran: 
Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964), 
90-94; Owen, “Eschatology”, 48-49; and Glasse, The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam, 107-110. 
11 Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research (New Brunswick & London: Aldine Transaction, 1999), 167. 
12 Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Thousand Oaks, London, 
& New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), xiii. 
13 Lesley Brown (ed.). The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
551. 
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of happiness and misery in the realm of barzakh. The discussion structure in elaborating this 
study is first describing the doctrine of happiness and misery in the realms of barzakh, then 
elaborating on Rahman's criticism of the doctrine, and finally analyze Rahman's criticism of 
the doctrine. 
 
The Doctrine of Happiness and Misery in the Realm of Barzakh 
As mentioned earlier, the majority of Muslims believe that there is happiness and 
misery that humans find when they are in the grave (the realm of barzakh).14 According to 
Smith and Haddad, there are at least five main sources that support this conception, namely: 
Al-Durrah al-Fākhirah by al-Ghazālī (11th century), Kitāb al-Rūḥ by Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah 
(14th century, which is generally seen as one of the most authoritative sources about the soul 
after physical death), Bushrā al-Ka'īb bi Liqā’ al-Ḥabīb by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (15th century), 
Kitāb al-Ḥaqā'iq wa al-Daqā'iq by Abū Laith al-Samarqandī (17th century), and Kitāb Aḥwāl 
al-Qiyāmah (without author’s name).15 
The understanding that develops among these scholars becomes a doctrine that is 
believed by most Muslims. These scholars in general identify barzakh as a place where humans 
receive retaliation for their deeds that lasts until the end of the world. The rewards or sins of 
humans will be revealed and retaliated immediately after they die.16 When humans die, the 
imagination that is in the soul (nafs) is also elevated together with the spirit (rūḥ) so that it is 
clean from the physical elements. At that time, a man realizes that he was dead until he was 
buried. He is like the original when in the world, who imagines himself buried in the ground. 
He will feel suffering and painful when, for example, facing a snake. That is the torment of the 
grave. If he is lucky, his soul will be able to imagine and feel happiness in the same form as 
 
14 Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection, 31-32. 
15 Ibid., 34. 
16 Al-Ghazālī, “Al-Maḍnūn bih ‘Alā Ghair Ahlih” in al-Ghazālī, Majmū’ah Rasā’il al-Imām al-Ghazālī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1996), 350.  
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what he believes, such as landscaping, clear rivers, angels, and so forth. That is the reward in 
the tomb.17 
According to the established understanding of the adherents of this doctrine, to 
determine whether a person is a recipient of rewards or punishment, they will first be examined 
and interrogated by angels guarding the grave.18 Al-Ghazālī19 elaborates that the first angel 
encountered by humans is Rummān, who asks people to write down the deeds he had done 
during his life in the world. Then the writing is hung around his neck. After Rummān 
assignment is completed, two other angels in horribly stature come to him. Their hair is long 
dragged to the ground; their voice is like lightning, and so on, until the deceased who see both 
trembled and turned away. These two angels enter the dead man’s nose so that he cannot move, 
the same as when he was dying before his death. Both angels then begin asking questions about 
who his God is, what his religion is, who his prophet is, and what his qiblah is. The answers to 
these questions will determine his existence in the hereafter. If he is able to answer these 
questions, he will receive a reward in the form of being shown and opened for him the door to 
heaven with a carpet of heaven’s silk and a fragrance of aroma so that the aroma enters the 
tomb. He will also be visited by his good deeds in the form of a man he loves the most and will 
cheer him on until the Day of Judgment. 
The events that will be faced by humans at that time are various and stratified. A lower 
level that will be experienced by a believer who can answer it is that he is shown and opened 
for him the door to hell but then closed again until he is fast asleep until the doomsday. If a 
believer cannot answer it, he will feel the punishment for his sins. But for those who are not 
believers, then it is clear, they will not be able to give the right answers. The mistake in these 
answers will depend on the type of sin they had committed during their life on earth. For 
 
17 Ibid.  
18 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Durrah al-Fākhirah fī Kashf ‘Ulūm al-Ākhirah, ed. Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Khāliq ‘Abd 
al-Qādir Aḥmad ‘Atā (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyyah, 1992), 35. 
19 Ibid., 35 ff. 
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example, for people who were constantly changing faith, they will have difficulty to answer, 
“Allah is my Lord.” For people who doubted Islam, they will be difficult to answer, “Islam is 
my religion.” For those who read the Qur’an but did not practice it, they will have difficulty 
answering “al-Qur’an is my guide,” and so forth.20 
Such is the illustration about the realm of barzakh which is generally believed in the 
Islamic world. This belief clearly illustrates the state of humans by linking it to pleasure and 
misery which is a retaliation for deeds they had done during their lifetime in the world. It is 
this view that is criticized by Rahman that will be elaborated in the next section. But before 
that, this study first describes the profile of Rahman and his attention to eschatology. 
 
Fazlur Rahman and his Attention to Eschatology 
Rahman was born in Hazara, Pakistan, on September 21, 1919. Growing up in a family 
under the school of thought (madhhab) of Ḥanafī, his father, Maulānā Shihāb al-Dīn, was a 
traditional Islamic scholar from Dār al-‘Ulūm, Deoband, India.21 Unlike his father, Rahman 
did not study at Dār al-‘Ulūm. However, he mastered the curriculum offered by the institute in 
private studies with his father. At the age of ten, he memorized the Qur’an. This completed his 
background in understanding traditional Islam, with particular attention to fiqh, dialectical 
theology or kalām, ḥadīth, interpretation, logic (manṭiq), and philosophy.22 
Rahman finished basic education upto master’s education in India. Doctoral education 
was achieved at Oxford University, England, in 1950 with a dissertation on Avicenna’s 
Psychology. He taught at Durham University, England, before moving to McGill University 
Canada.23 He returned to Pakistan (formerly part of India) and served as director of the Central 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ebrahim Moosa, “Introduction” in Fazlur Rahman, Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study of Islamic 
Fundamentalism, ed. Ebrahim Moosa (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), 1. 
22 Ibid.; Fazlur Rahman, “An Autobiographical Note,” in The Courage of Conviction, ed. Philip L. 
Berman (New York: Ballantine Bookes, 1985), 135. 
23 Moosa, “Introduction,” 1. 
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Institute of Islamic Research (1961-1958). This important position provided him with the 
opportunity to closely examine government and power. This period according to Moosa24 is 
“the most tumultuous period” in Rahman’s life history. Rahman made various breakthroughs 
that had never been done before such as sending students to Western countries. This 
breakthrough had been challenged by traditional and fundamental groups. So strong was the 
challenge that he was forced to move from his country.25 
Rahman was accepted as a lecturer at the University of California, Los Angeles, in 
1968. Then in 1969, he was appointed professor in the field of Islamic thought at the University 
of Chicago. This university was his last place of work, until he died in Chicago, Illinois, on 
July 26, 1988.26 Rahman was a thinker and prolific writer who made a lot of contributions to 
Islamic thought through publications, lectures, and the cadre of young scientists who came 
from various countries to study under his care. In addition to teaching and writing, he was also 
often asked by leading centers of study in the West to give lectures or participate in 
international seminars related to Islam. Among his works are Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy 
and Orthodoxy (1958), Islamic Metodology in History (1965), Islam (1966), Major Themes of 
the Qur’an (1980), Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (1982), 
dan Revival and Reform in Islam (2000). 
Rahman’s view on eschatology in general can be seen in his Major Themes of the 
Qur’an,27 although the discussion about barzakh is found only in his Health and Medicine in 
the Islamic Tradition: Change and Identity.28 In Major Themes, Rahman puts eschatology as 
one of the great themes of the Qur’an. Thus, Rahman places eschatology in a significant 
position in Islamic literature. This seems to be related to the fact that in the Qur’an, the 
 
24 Ibid., 2. 
25 See Fazlur Rahman, “Some Islamic Issues in the Ayub Khan Era, Essay on Islamic Civilization,” in 
Essays on Islamic Civilization, ed. Donald P. Little (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 299 ff. 
26 Moosa, “Introduction,” 1. 
27 Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an (Chicago & Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980). 
28 Published in New York by the Crossroad Publishing Company, 1987. 
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description of eschatology occupies a central and significant position besides the idea of God.29 
Rahman himself states that “in Qur’anic terms no real morality is possible without the 
regulative ideas of God and the Last Judgment.”30 In other words, whatever doctrine is spoken 
by the verses of the Quran, it is always in association with the doctrine of eschatology. 
However, there is a problem that often arises when the discourse of eschatology is 
discussed. The problem is about the fate of Islamic eschatology itself. If Islamic eschatology 
in the medieval ages gained momentum for discussion in the hands of theologians and 
philosophers, then in the current era, along with the strengthening of social-empirical scientific 
discourse, studies of eschatological metaphysical studies seem to have not been so developed 
anymore, not to say abandoned. Philosophers and scientists in this era are more interested in 
contemporary empirical social issues, such as gender equality, human rights, justice, 
democracy, and so forth.31 They are apparently uninterested in non-empirical eschatological 
issues. As a result, this phenomenon can lead to the assumption that the problem of the 
eschatological metaphysics is a classic problem which is no longer relevant for discussion in 
the contemporary era. This phenomenon also leads to the claim that the issue of eschatology in 
the Islamic world is considered to be already established. It is this phenomenon that is regretted 
by Rahman,32 where the discussion of eschatology is considered to have been established so 
that it does not need to be discussed anymore. 
The establishment of the thought of eschatology in the Islamic world turned out to have 
a connection with the role played by medieval theologians. These theologians turn on the flow 
of orthodoxy in the Islamic scientific world. Among the orthodoxy figures who was 
 
29 Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection, 63-65. 
30 Fazlur Rahman, Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago & London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 14. 
31 See among others Asghar Ali Engineer that pays great attention to gender studies in Rights of Women 
in Islam (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1992); Mahmoud Mohammed Taha that is preoccupied with sharī’ah 
renewal efforts in The Second Massage of Islam, trans. Al-Na’im (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1987); and Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī who cares deeply about the Arab-Islamic tradition in Al-Turāth wa al-
Ḥadāthah: Dirāsāt wa Munāqashāt (Beirut: Al-Markadh al-Thaqāfī al-‘Arabī, 1991).  
32 See Rahman, “Islamic Philosophy”, IV: 222; Rahman, Islam, 120. 
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outstanding according to Rahman was al-Ghazālī.33 This figure is considered to have 
contributed to the burial of the philosophical study of eschatology in the Islamic world. Until, 
after he launched his attack on the conceptions of philosophers through Tahāfut al-Falāsifah,34 
in which the discussion of eschatology was one of its important topics, the discussion of 
concepts of eschatology ended. Although Rahman himself basically disagreed with the ideas 
of the philosophers who were attacked, he deeply regretted the impact of the attack. The biggest 
direct impact, according to Rahman, is the doctrines of eschatology, which were formerly 
philosophically formulated in the hands of philosophers, now only become condemnation 
material in the Islamic world.35 It should be that the doctrines of eschatology that currently 
seems to have been established still could be critically debated and discussed again in the hands 
of the present generation.36 
 
Fazlur Rahman’s Criticism of the Doctrine of Happiness and Misery in the Realm of 
Barzakh 
To examine Rahman’s criticism of the doctrine of happiness and misery in the realm of 
barzakh, the first thing that is important to know is that his criticism in this case arises in 
relation to his criticism of orthodoxy which has developed since the Middle Ages.37 In 
Rahman’s view, those who have played a role in reviving this orthodoxy are: (1) dogmatic 
theologians who allow limited use of reason to explain and support dogma; (2) acute dogmatics 
who oppose the authority of reason and only use it occasionally to strike rationalist positions; 
 
33 Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
1958), 92-93. 
34 Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma’ārif, 1966). 
35 Rahman, “Islamic Philosophy”, IV: 222. 
36 Rahman, Islam, 120. 
37 Ibid. 
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and (3) those between these two positions, who accept the use of reason but reject philosophers 
and Sufism.38 
These orthodox people, especially dogmatic theologians, have caused a sharp decline 
in the discussion of eschatology in the Islamic world. The existing discussion is more of a 
narrative that aims to give fear and hope to ordinary people.39 Using Rahman’s perspective, the 
concept of barzakh that develops in the Islamic world is not immune from such characteristics, 
where the discussion is more of a sensual narrative that has an impact and aims to frighten 
people of the conditions experienced by humans after death. As can be seen in the doctrine of 
happiness and misery in the realms of barzakh above, people’s attention is brought to a very 
frightening situation when humans meet with angels who are tasked with interrogating and 
judging them. In this connection, Rahman rejects the narrative that portrays barzakh as an 
intermediary realm revealing and providing pleasures and torments before the coming of the 
doomsday because the doctrine does not originate from the Qur'an, as in his statement, 
 
On the other hand, other developments counter-balanced such a sense of complacency, 
mainly the introduction of the doctrine of the “chastisement in the grave” imported from 
Zoroastrianism in Iran. The idea that a dead person does not have to await the Day of 
Judgement to receive rewards and punishment but begins his reckoning in the grave 
does not exist in the Qur’an but abounds in the Hadith.40 
 
 So, for Rahman, the doctrine of the reward of pleasure and torture in the realm of 
barzakh is not based on the Qur’an, but from the ḥadīths. Because it is not sourced from the 
Qur’an, the doctrine is not Islamic teaching. The doctrine is more a doctrine adopted from the 
 
38 Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy, 92-93. 
39 Rahman, Islam, 110. 
40 Rahman, Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition, 127. 
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teachings of Zoroastrianism. This Rahman’s opinion in principle rejects the theological beliefs 
that are rooted in Muslims. In this case, Rahman did not dismiss that there were a lot of ḥadīths 
that spoke of the doctrine, but he did not accept them. Thus, in seeing the ḥadīth, Rahman is 
also very critical because as he admits, ḥadīth experienced a massive falsification in the past in 
connection with the internal political conflict of Muslims in quite a long time.41 
In a broader scope, Rahman highlights the characteristics of scientific discourse 
dominated by medieval theologians which continue to be preserved to nowadays. Rahman42 
doubts that the typical medieval theological and metaphysical arguments are based on the 
Qur’an because the Hellenic (Greek) tradition also played such a large role at that time. This 
view is of course based on his carefulness in observing the compatibility of their interpretations 
with the Qur’an. The affirmation which on the one hand criticizes Muslim metaphysics and 
orthodox and on the other hand presupposes the need for metaphysical thoughts that are fully 
imbued with the Qur'an in turn not only limited to theological and metaphysical problems, but 
also to other problems such as ethics and law. Rahman states, “One cannot point to a single 
work of ethics squarely based upon the Qur’an, although there are numerous works based upon 
Greek philosophy, Persian tradition and Sufi piety.”43  
The emergence of Rahman’s claim that the doctrine of happiness and misery in the 
realm of barzakh is a teaching that originates from Zoroastrianism is, presumably, in 
accordance with what he criticizes for the approach taken by philosophers and theologians who, 
although they have studied the Qur’an but did not make the Qur’an as a source and center of 
study. Their study of the Qur’an shows that there are other sources that are used as references, 
 
 
41  For more details, see Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Methodology in History (Delhi: Adam Publishers & 
Distributors, 1994), 1-84. 
42 Rahman, Islam & Modernity, 132. 
43 Rahman, Islam, 257. 
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The philosophers, and often the Sufis, did understand the Qur’an as a unity, but this 
unity was imposed upon the Qur’an (and Islam in general) from without rather than 
derived from a study of the Qur’an itself. Certain thought systems and thought 
orientations were adopted from outside sources (not necessarily wholly antagonistic to 
the Qur’an but certainly alien to and not infrequently incompatible with it), adapted 
somewhat to the Islamic mental milieu, and expressed mostly in Islamic terminology, 
but this thin veneer could not hide the fact that their basic structure of ideas was not 
drawn from within the Qur’an itself.44 
 
So, Rahman has found many of the teachings of Islam that have been developed and 
studied to this day which are covered by various outside references that may be in accordance 
with the Qur’an or even contradictory. Related to this study, Rahman’s claim that links the 
concept of barzakh with the teachings that develop in Zoroastrianism will be examined in the 
next section. After that, this study seeks to investigate the disclosure of the barzakh in Islamic 
texts, the Qur’an and ḥadīth. 
 
Identification of Zoroastrianism in the Concept of Barzakh 
Zoroastrianism is one of the oldest religions in the world, more than three thousand 
years in its history, which originated in pre-Islamic Iran. The term Zoroaster refers to the name 
of its founder, Zarathustra, who probably lived around the first millennium BC.45 The influence 
of Zoroastrianism in other religions is indeed quite evident in many of its doctrines, especially 
 
44 Rahman, Islam & Modernity, 3. 
45  Gherardo Gnoli, “Zoroastrianism” in The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, & London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987), XV: 579. 
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the building of the doctrine of eschatology which greatly influences Western thought 
(Babylonian or Hellenistic).46  
The doctrine of Zoroastrian eschatology which can then be related to Rahman’s claim 
above seems historically to be the polemic that once graced the ancient Persian world in the 
middle of the third millennium BC. This initial polemic gave rise to the duality of claims in 
interpreting death: the concept of neutral death and the concept of moral death. The first 
assumes that man will self-destruct after he dies and there will be no resurrection. On the 
contrary, the second assumes that man will be faced with moral accountability for all the deeds 
he had done in this world.47 The initial Persian concept which was later adopted in 
Zoroastrianism seems to be what some people in the future believed, especially the study of 
religions above, had an influence in the eschatology of world religions including Islam.48 
The beliefs of these reviewers to link the Zoroastrian eschatology with Islamic 
eschatology which later was justified by Rahman at a glance seemed to undermine the concept 
of Islamic eschatology which has been established steadily by classical scholars. However, if 
this claim is traced and explored from the perspective of the history of religions, then it can be 
justified, because there are strong indications shown by experts such as Carnoy49 that the 
doctrines of Persian eschatology, whose conversion is not too well known, have been well 
preserved in Iran through Islam (Muhammadanism). 
Apart from the validity of the argument presented by Rahman and the reviewers of 
religions, this doctrine had basically been made an important discourse for the pre-Islamic 
Jāhiliyyah community. This can be clearly identified from the poetic sources attributed to them, 
 
46 Ibid., 586. Regarding the influence, see A. J. Carnoy, “Zoroastrianism,” in Encyclopaedia of Religion 
and Ethics, ed. James Hastings (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, & New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1954), XII: 
866-867. 
47  Lihat Alan E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early 
Christian Worlds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3-4. 
48 Lihat Carnoy, “Zoroastrianism,” 867. 
49 Ibid. 
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as demonstrated by Izutsu50 and Smith & Haddad.51 However, because their support was very 
limited and did not have solid references that could be accounted for, the Qur’an came and 
changed the discourse of eschatology in the pre-Islamic Arab community. This fact is, 
according to Izutsu, what distinguishes the Qur’an’s eschatology from Jāhiliyyah Arab 
eschatology.52 Then maybe it is these remnants of the Jāhiliyyah Arab conception that 
penetrate—if indeed true—into Islamic eschatology. This conjecture can be justified as 
affirmed by Aḥmad Āmīn53 that the history of early Islam has been colored by the intense 
acculturation of non-Muslim culture into the doctrines of Islamic teachings. This acculturation 
is increasingly apparent when a group among ex-non-Muslims is treated as a second-class 
society during the Umayyad era. They exhaled their old ideas and teachings into their new 
religion (Islam), originating from Judaism, Christianity, and old Persia.54  
So, historically, based on the evidence that can be explained, Rahman’s claim is to some 
extent justified. Moreover, Izutsu in this case has also identified that pre-Islamic Arab 
eschatological discourse was altered and modified by the Qur’an. However, the next problem 
is what if the concept of happiness and misery in the realm of barzakh is viewed from the 
normative side? The conception of Zoroastrianism that can be related to the concept of barzakh 
is the teaching that three days after someone dies and feels the pain of separation of body and 
soul, he will meet his daena, namely his own self-image that changes into a beautiful girl fifteen 
years old. This is as revealed in the Encyclopedia of Religion: “Three days after death and the 
painful separation of the soul from the body, the just will meet their daena, the image of their 
own self, who will be disguised as a beautiful fifteen-year-old girl.”55 
 
50  According to Izutsu: “There are certain undeniable traces in pre-Islamic poetry of a belief in the 
Hereafter associated with the idea of the Day of Reckoning beyond the grave.” Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran, 
91. For more details, see pages 90-94, 123-132. 
51 See Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection, 147-155. 
52 Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran, 94. 
53 Aḥmad Āmīn, Fajr al-Islām (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahḍah, 1967), 160. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Gnoli, “Zoroastrianism,” 585. 
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The daena is greatly influenced by the thoughts, words, and deeds of the deceased 
during lifetime. If these three things are more dominated by goodness, then someone will 
encounter the image of paradise. But on the contrary, if they are dominated by evil, then he 
will encounter the image of hell. As for someone who is not among the two, then he will live 
in a place called hamistagan (mixed area), a residence of shadows where he does not feel either 
pleasure or misery.56 
Therefore, based on the information that can be explored as above, there are indeed 
indicators of conformity between the Islamic barzakh doctrine and the Zoroastrian doctrine. 
But ensuring that the doctrine influences Islamic doctrine, it is a conclusion that may be too 
bold and hasty. It is because although the Qur’an does not explicitly mention the existence of 
this doctrine, several indicators that point to it can identify it. Perhaps, because the information 
is generally found only from the ḥadīths which are difficult to compromise with the information 
contained in the Qur’an, then many parties from Islam such as followers of the Mu’tazilah, 
Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, and some Shiites deny the existence of the doctrine of torture and pleasure of 
the barzakh.57 
 
Islamic texts about Barzakh 
Since there is no verse in the Qur’an that states the obligation to believe in the doctrine 
of happiness and misery in the realm of barzakh, then believing or not believing the doctrine 
is the right of every Muslim. Nevertheless, the following section will elaborate the doctrine 
through interpretation of the verses of the Qur’an and the ḥadīths. 
There are three terms used by the Qur’an to point to the realm of barzakh: First, barzakh 
that is derived from the root word  هزرب  which is then Arabicized to be  خزرب 58 that means 
 
56 Ibid. 
57 Madjid, Islam Agama Peradaban, 196. 
58 Al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma’ānī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1994), XIX: 50. 
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partition. The term barzakh is usually attributed to three contexts, namely: the land which is 
cut off due to the separation of the two seas, the separator between the world and the hereafter, 
and in between doubt and confidence in the matter of faith.59 This word is mentioned three 
times and does not experience any change or derivation (taṣrīf). But of the three, only one 
designates the barzakh in the eschatological context, while the other two relate to the sea. The 
single term barzakh which explains the realm of barzakh is the Qur’an, Sūrah al-Mu’minūn 
[23]: 100 (نوثعبي موي ىلا خزرب مهئارو نمو). Popular exegesis books such as Tafsīr al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, 
Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr, Rūḥ al-Ma’ānī, Tafsīr al-Kashshāf, and Jāmi’ 
al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’ān interpret barzakh with a separator (al-ḥājiz) or a delimiter 
(al-māni’).60 Therefore, barzakh here, in accordance with the semantic structure, means the 
separator or delimiter between the world and the hereafter. The word warā’ahum (behind them) 
in the verse is considered as a metaphor to be interpreted as amāmahum (before them) so that 
it is translated as “... before them is a partition...”61  
The other two barzakh terms are 
 
  :ناقرفلا(     اروجحم ارجحو اخزرب امهنيب لعجو جاجا حلم اذهو تارف بذع اذه نيرحبلا جرم يذلا وهو53 )  
 : نمحرلا(    نايغبي لا خزرب امهنيب20)  
 
 
59 Louis al-Ma’lūf, Al-Munjid fī al-Lughah wa al-A’lām (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986), 34. See also Ibn 
Manẓūr, Lisān al-‘Arab (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1994), III: 8. 
60 Al-Andalūsī, Tafsīr al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1993), VI: 388; Muḥammad 
Ḥusain al-Ṭabaṭṭabā’ī, Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-A’lamī lī al-Maṭbū’āt, 1991), XV: 68; 
Ismā’īl ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (Beirut: Dār al-Andalūs, 1966), V: 39; Al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma’ānī, XVIII: 96; 
al-Zamakhsharī, Tafsīr al-Kashshāf (Tehran: Intishārāt Af’itāb, n.d.), III: 42; Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, 
Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’ān (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1995), XVIII: 68. 
61 See Abdullah Yusuf ‘Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1997), 
346. 
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In the first verse (25: 53), although barzakh is metaphor (majāz),62 it is interpreted as a 
barrier or partition,63 which limits two seas,64 one salty and one tasteless. According to al-
Ṭabarī,65 [two kinds of water] still meet but [two kinds of taste] do not mix to each other in the 
sense that one damages the other. Likewise, the second verse (55: 20) shows that there are two 
seas that are separated because they are limited by land.66 Ali translates the barzakh as a barrier 
as well.67 The seas meant by one of the narrations are the Persian and Roman seas.68 These two 
verses are basically not the object of this study, but since the term barzakh in both verses is a 
barrier or partition, it will be evidence to reinforce arguments of this study. Or even though the 
two verses do not have a relation to the realm of barzakh, they are closely related to the meaning 
of barzakh in language. 
Second, qabr. This term is mentioned eight times in various derivatives. At least, this 
term is mentioned in four derivations (al-qubūr repeated five times; qabr repeated one time; 
aqbara repeated one time; and maqābir repeated one time). The meaning contained in this term 
is the meaning in accordance with the derivation. For example, qabr is translated as a grave 
and aqbara is translated as burying. This term in principle refers to the grave as a place where 
the dead is buried.69 Third, ajdāth. This word is a plural form of the word jadatha, meaning 
grave. Some people have replaced the letter "ث" with "ف" (jadafa), but the plural form is also 
ajdāth, not ajdāf.70 That is why interpretive books generally interpret it a grave (al-qabr). This 
 
62 Al-Andalūsī, Tafsīr al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, VI: 464; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, XXIV: 
101. It could be meant as exaltation as well, see al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma’ānī, XIX: 51. 
63 ‘Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, 362. 
64 See among others al-Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, XXIV:101; al-Ṭabaṭṭabā’ī, Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-
Qur’ān, XV: 228. 
65 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’ān, XIX: 32. 
66  Ibid.; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, XXIX:102; al-Andalūsī, Tafsīr al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, VIII: 
189; Kathīr, Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr, VI:489; al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma’ānī, XXVII: 162. 
67 ‘Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, 556. 
68 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘An Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’ān, XXVII: 168. 
69 See for examples al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Ay al-Qur’ān, XXX: 106,362; al-Ṭabaṭṭabā’ī, 
Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, XX: 228. 
70 See Ibn Manz ūr, Lisān al-‘Arab, II: 128. Al-Alūsī is among those who equate jadatha with jadafa. 
Al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma’ānī, XXIII: 46. 
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term is found three times, all in the plural, namely in the Sūrah Yā Sīn [36]: 51,71 al-Qamar 
[54]: 7,72 and al-Ma’ārij [70]: 43.73 
Thus, qabr and ajdāth have the same meaning, which is equally pointing to the material 
form as a place for dead humans. The difference is that qabr experiences derivation while 
ajdāth is only in the plural. As for barzakh, it emphasizes its existence as a separator between 
the two realms, so that the appropriate term used to study the theme of eschatology in this case 
is the term barzakh. So, based on the verses above, the concept of the realm of barzakh is not 
denied by the Qur'an. The problem is whether in the realm of barzakh there is pleasure and 
misery prepared before the apocalypse. For this reason, this study attempts to investigate the 
arguments on this issue based on the verses of the Qur'an and the relevant ḥadīths. 
First, in the Sūrah al-Mu'min [40]: 46, it says, 74 
 
 : نمؤملا(         باذعلا دشا نوعرف لا اولخدا ةعاسلا موقت مويو ايشعو اودغ اهيلع نوضرعي رانلا46)  
 
In front of the Fire will they be brought, morning and evening: and (the sentence will 
be) on the Day that Judgment will be established: “Cast ye the people of Pharaoh into 
the severest Penalty!”75 
 
This verse, according to al-Rāzī,76 is often used as evidence by the recipients of the 
doctrine of happiness and misery in the realm of barzakh. Al-Rāzī, who rejects this doctrine, 
 
71 See among others al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Ay al-Qur’ān, XXIII: 20; al-Ṭabaṭṭabā’ī, Al-
Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, XVII: 99. But Ibn Kathīr considers that the trumpet blast here is the third. Kathīr, Tafsīr 
Ibn Kathīr, V: 620. 
72 See among others al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Ay al-Qur’ān, XXVII: 119; al-Ṭabaṭṭabā’ī, Al-
Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, XIX: 60; Kathīr, Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr, VI: 472; Al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma’ānī, XXVII: 122.  
73 See among others al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Ay al-Qur’ān, XXIX: 109; al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-
Ma’ānī, XXIX: 112. 
74 Related to this verse, see also the Quran S. 2: 154: 
    نورعشت لا نكلو ءايحا لب تاوما الله ليبس ىف لتقي نمل اولوقت لاو  
75 ‘Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, 481-482. 
76 See al-Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, XXVII: 73 
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offers philosophical reasons to counter the theses which accepts the doctrine mainly through 
the interpretation of this verse. According to him, the interpretation of the recipients of the 
doctrine is not true because: (1) the punishment must always be there continuously without 
breaking up, while morning and evening in the verse shows that apart from the two times there 
is no penalty, and this is impossible; (2) the terms morning and evening only apply to the 
natural world. Al-Rāzī77 himself further understands this verse as: (1) the word “brought” there 
is when in the natural world in the form of news of hell, not the soul (form) of hell; (2) it is not 
enough in just two times for torture. Therefore, it is on the Day of Judgment that hell is found 
and it is eternal; (3) may be the mention of ghuduw (morning) and ‘ashiy (evening) as metaphor 
of the eternity. 
This argument proposed by al-Rāzī seems trapped in understanding the solidity of time 
and place that prevails outside this world, or specifically in the hereafter. Time in the world is 
formed by the pattern of relationships between the earth, the moon, and the sun, so it is known 
morning, afternoon, evening, and night. Murata and Chittick78 argue that the existence of the 
grave is not the same as the existence of our nature in this world, so that everything takes place 
with different rules. For example, time loses its solidity and eternity. In other words, in this 
world, someone can say the amount of time that has passed by observing the circulation of the 
sun or moon or by looking at the clock. But in the grave world time is closely related to 
subjective perceptions of what happens. 
In addition, Shihab’s analysis of the above verse is worth considering, namely, that the 
statement “on the Day that Judgment will be established,” angels are ordered to put the people 
of Pharaoh into the hell, showing that the appearance of hell to them certainly happened before 
the apocalypse. This means that they live in a different nature from the natural world, where 
 
77 Ibid., 73-74. 
78  Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, The Vision of Islam (London & New York: I.B. Tauris 
Publishers, 1996), 202. 
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their views become sharper because they are able to see hell. On the other hand, this also 
indicates that seeing hell which will be their place must be very terrible, which is an 
extraordinary torture, before they get even more severe torture, which is really falling into 
hell.79 
Second, the verse that is often used as an argument by those who reject this doctrine is 
in the Sūrah Yā Sīn [36]: 52, 
 
 : سي(   … اندقرم نم انثعب نم انليوي اولاق52 )  
  
They will say: “Ah! Woe unto us! Who hath raised us up from our beds of repose?” 
…80 
 
Those who reject the doctrine regard that the infidels at that time feel themselves asleep 
and jerked awake when they hear the sound of the trumpet. Their rejection logic is that if the 
infidels do fall asleep and wake up, then how could there be a realm of barzakh.81 To respond 
ro this question, al-Alūsī82 argues that what is meant by اندقرم here is “al-qabr,” not saying 
“Who hath raised us up from our sleep?” but “Who hath raised us up from our beds of repose?” 
Beds of repose means the grave. Shaikh al-Ṭabarī83 is even very sure that the existence of the 
terms of barzakh and qabr in the Qur’an indicates torture in the realm of barzakh. The grave 
referred to here is not a piece of land where the body is buried, but a realm that is not a natural 
world, neither “post-apocalypse” nature. This last-mentioned-realm is prepared after the Day 
of Judgment. 
 
79 M. Quraish Shihab, Perjalanan Menuju Keabadian: Kematian, Surga dan Ayat-ayat Tahlil (Jakarta: 
Lentera Hati, 2001), 91. 
80 ‘Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, 447. 
81 Shihab, Perjalanan Menuju Keabadian, 88-89. 
82 See al-Alūsī, Rūḥ al-Ma’ānī, XXIII: 46; al-Ṭabaṭṭabā’ī, Al-Mīzān fi Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, XVII: 99. 
83 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmi’ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Ay al-Qur’ān, XXX: 363. 
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 Third, besides the two verses above, which some who reject the doctrine often used 
both as an argument, there are other verses that explicitly state the existence of the doctrine. 
Al-Sanūsī,84 for example, says that verses such as in the Sūrah Āli Imrān [3]: 69; Ghāfir [40]: 
46; Nūḥ [71]: 25; Al-Dukhān [44]: 56; Al-Naml [27]: 80; and Ghāfir [40]: 11, will basically 
justify the view that in the realm of barzakh, there is pleasure and punishment that Allah gives 
undeniably. 
Fourth, there are many ḥadīths that discuss this doctrine, so it is very risky to deny its 
existence using only one or two verses that at first glance look different from the statements. It 
is undeniable that some of the ḥadīths circulating in the Islamic world often do not have a 
definite and firm basis for their validity, but some others are very difficult to reject based on 
the principles of ḥadīth science that are recognized by the majority of scholars. Among these 
ḥadīths, for example, are narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, as follows:85 
 
-  باذع معن لاقف ربقلا باذع نم الله كذاعا اهل تلاقف ربقلا باذع تركذف اهيلع تلخد ةيدوهي نا تلاق ربقلا
ت لاا ةلاص ىلص دعب ملسو هيلع الله ىلص الله لوسر تيار امف اهنع الله يضر ةشئاع ربقلا باذع نم ذوع  
 
Verily a Jewish woman came to ‘Ā’ishah and asked about the torment of the grave. 
‘Ā’ishah then said to the woman: May Allah protect you from the torment of the grave. 
[When it was asked to the Prophet,] he said: true, that is the punishment of the grave. 
‘Ā’ishah r.a. said: I have never seen the Messenger of Allah doing prayers except by 
praying to Allah for the protection from the torment of the grave. 
 
 
84 Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Sanūsī, Sharḥ al-Sanūsiyyah al-Kubrā (Kuwait: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), 401-402. 
85 Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981), II: 102-103. 
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-   ايحملا ةنتف نمو رانلا باذع نمو ربقلا باذع نم كب ذوعا ينا مهللا وعدي ملسو هيلع الله ىلص الله لوسر ناك
 لاجدلا حيسملا ةنتف نمو تامملاو 
 
The Messenger of Allah SAW. always prays: O Allah, verily I beg for Your 
protection from the torment of the grave, the torment of hell, the slander in this 
life, the slander of death, and the slander of the Messiah al-Dajjāl. 
 
Given that there are many ḥadīths narrating the doctrine, experts such as Shihab cannot 
deny the torment and pleasure in the realm of barzakh. According to Shihab,86 it is very difficult 
to reject this doctrine only because it is based on the logic of the natural world and the laws 
that apply in the natural world, whereas, before, it has been proven that there are other worlds 
and there are also laws that apply to those in there. Furthermore, Shihab makes an analogy, 
“This is similar to the natural laws that apply in space, which are different from those that apply 
on earth, as proven and experienced by astronauts.”87 
 
Conclusions 
Based on what has been explained above, it can be concluded that: First, the doctrine 
of barzakh which is generally believed by the majority of Muslims is that the realm of barzakh 
is the intermediary realm found by humans after their death which lasts until the Day of 
Judgment. This doctrine teaches that in the realm of barzakh, humans get retaliation for all the 
deeds they had done while living in the world. This retaliation can take the form of pleasure or 
happiness and torture or misery depending on the value of all their deeds. Before getting the 
 
86 Shihab, Perjalanan Menuju Keabadian, 94. 
87 Ibid.  
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retaliation, humans are first met with angels whose job is to test the value of all his deeds. 
These angels are also tasked with providing pleasure or torture to humans. 
Second, in rejecting the doctrine of happiness and misery in the realm of barzakh, 
Rahman bases his views on three reasons: firstly, the doctrine does not originate from the 
Qur’an. Then, the doctrine is found in the ḥadīths. In this case, it does not have to be understood 
that Rahman rejects all ḥadīths, but this is related to his belief that the falsification of ḥadīth on 
a large scale happened in quite a long time. The last, the doctrine was allegedly the fruit of 
tradition imported from Zoroastrianism. Rahman’s criticism in this matter cannot be separated 
from his general criticism of Islamic scholarship. According to him, Islamic scholarship that 
had been built primarily by theologians and metaphysics since the Middle Ages is loaded with 
elements from outside Islam, in the sense of not being sourced from the Qur’an. 
Third, Rahman’s criticism of the barzakh doctrine is to a certain extent justified but 
ensuring the doctrine of happiness and misery in the realm of barzakh as a doctrine imported 
from Zoroastrianism seems too excessive. Perhaps because he was too eager to clean up strange 
elements of Islamic scholarship, the doctrine that is actually supported by the majority of 
Qur’an commentators was not immune to his suspicion. This doctrine has been accepted and 
explained by many famous commentators based on the verses of the Qur’an. In addition, there 
are many ḥadīths that explain and acknowledge this doctrine, so it is very risky to reject it.  
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